RBF
is certainly no exception.
The Hobart Airport investment via Tasmanian Gateway Consortium (TGC) was a classic example, predicated on the assumption that the good times would last forever as per Macquarie Bank’s crystal ball.
Macquarie
came to town as part of Operation Stealing Candy from a Baby HERE
and sweet talked RBF into parting with $100 million for a non controlling
minority interest in an airport at nearly twice the going rate at 27 times
earnings, which necessitated a high degree of leverage to achieve the required
return, which in turn led to the fixing of interest rates, ostensibly to
placate nervous financiers but realistically designed to lock in returns for
lenders, which together with a management fee which approximated 15% of
earnings for a bit of paper shuffling and a couple of long lunches with
bankers, ended up removing all the investors’ gains.
RBF
should have been extracting steady rents from the deal. It was in a good
position as a cashed up fund with implicit State Government backing.
Instead
it became the perfect partner for the financiers and deal makers as the latter
locked in their returns ahead of RBF who ended up with an empty promise of blue
sky.
Had
RBF been unwilling, it would have been daylight robbery.
But
there was worse.