(Co-written with Graeme Wells, Adjunct Senior Researcher at the University of Tasmania).
The public discussion re
the proposed AFL stadium at Macquarie Point has become a bit of a shouting
match where the pro and cons of an AFL side and the manoeuvrings of politicians
and AFL managers have taken centre stage.
In our view it is important we don’t lose sight of the fundamentals which must underpin sensible public policy. It is for this reason we have chosen to comment on a recent study given prominence in the media which essentially ridiculed expert reports about the economic case for the stadium.
Mr Hanson’s recent contribution to the economic case for the proposed AFL stadium has received extensive coverage in the Mercury. It has been described as uncovering a gold mine for Tasmania. He claims to identify deficiencies in the expert analysis provided to the government. Unfortunately, his creative adjustments to the government business case, which included a benefit cost analysis (BCA), are misleading and based on a misunderstanding of BCAs. This article is intended to correct the record.
The government’s most
recent Fiscal Strategy includes a welcome development – that infrastructure
investments must return a benefit-cost ratio greater than one. If, as our
analysis shows, the benefit – cost ratio is much less than one, the Stadium
project falls at the first hurdle.
The whole point of a BCA
is to assess whether the stadium is a socially desirable investment.
Tasmanian government policy
requires major infrastructure investments have a benefit-cost ratio greater
than one. In other words, benefits need to exceed costs.
The BCA undertaken by MI
Global forecasts a ratio of just 0.5. One dollar of benefit for every two
dollars spent. The expert analysis by MI Global also conducted sensitivity
analysis to test the robustness of its conclusion. In the best-case scenario,
with construction costs twenty percent lower and visitation benefits twenty
percent higher the benefit-cost ratio, if both favourable cases apply, was, at
0.73, still less than one.
A BCA looks at what
benefits result from the outlays regardless of how a project is financed. The
question of how to finance a project producing net benefits is a separate
issue. It is misleading to conflate the two and conclude that if someone else
finances part of the deal, an otherwise dud project gets the thumbs up.
In assessing a project
from society’s point of view, a BCA values resources at their opportunity cost.
How could the resources used to build the stadium have been used elsewhere? Mr
Hanson is untroubled by possible alternative uses for resources. He might
believe there is no economic return from health spending compared to returns
from a stadium from Day 1, but fortunately few others do.
Opportunity cost is often
easy to measure. The cost of a plumber building the stadium, for example, is
just the wage she could have earned on an alternative building site. Similarly
for all the other inputs into the construction. For the BCA report, the
opportunity cost of Tasmanian resources used to build the stadium was $750m.
This opportunity cost is incurred regardless of how the stadium is financed.
That the federal government is to contribute $240m to the Macquarie Point
precinct has no bearing on the opportunity costs of the resources employed to
build the stadium.
If the federal Treasury guidelines had been
followed, the opportunity cost of the stadium’s 5.6 hectares of land would also
have been included. Macquarie point is valuable land. From society’s
perspective it is not free. To ignore this opportunity cost in a benefit-cost
analysis, together with Mr Hanson’s discount to the $750m construction cost,
means that his version of costs is understated by a wide margin.
The project should be
precisely defined. The government business case is focussed on the stadium and
the ongoing costs and benefits directly associated with it. The Hanson report
takes a different tack. It includes, as benefits, estimates of the AFL’s annual
base funding (on a similar basis to existing AFL teams) and, apparently,
spending by the players and other AFL employees living in Tasmania.
These claims are not
directly relevant to a BCA for the stadium. If they were, offsetting costs
should also be counted. These include the $60m construction cost of the
training facility, the opportunity cost of the land on which it is based, and
the annual $12m commitment by the government to support the new club. Again,
the Hanson report understates the costs.
One of the flaws of the
BCA was the assumption that projected occupancy of almost one major event per
fortnight (10,000 people or more) would be achieved in the first year. Mr
Hanson was happy to accept this absurdity because it suited his predetermined
case.
Finally, both the
government BCA and the Hanson report ignore the penalties for late completion
of the stadium, and if AFL attendance falls below target levels. It is
difficult to assess the likelihood of these clauses being activated. But it is
standard practice in long term contracts to consider these as potential
costs.
The Hanson report
finishes with an expanded list of possible events to add to the government
business case. In my youth I liked the rock band entitled Weddings, Parties,
Anything. This would also be a good title for Mr Hanson’s speculative list.
It is often claimed that
if resources used on the stadium were reallocated to the health budget, it
would yield ‘no economic return’ (Hanson, p.5). A 2021 report by Wells Economic
Analysis calculated the private cost of elective surgery waiting lists in
Tasmania to be $120m per annum. It would be easy to list many other examples of
economic benefits from even marginal increases in health spending.
As the economist Keynes
famously remarked, digging holes and paying people to refill them has a
significant impact on economic activity and employment. But we are in an
economy with a shortage of qualified tradespeople, not to mention vacant
inner-city land. Surely there are more socially desirable investments
available. That’s why a BCA is so important. When analysed using
consistent principles, the stadium has a benefit-cost ratio significantly less
than one. So, while some have described the stadium as a gold mine, a
benefit-cost ratio significantly less than one suggests it’s fool’s
gold.
At last, some common sense. Thank you for writing this.
ReplyDeleteThere are no penalties if attendance falls below target levels. This is a complete misunderstanding of the contract. Perhaps the author should read it thoroughly before peddling misstruths spread by others.
ReplyDeleteClause 5 refers to shortfalls in revenue targets if an alternative stadium is required because on non-availability of Mac Point. We read this as being additional to the $4.5m penalty for non-availability referred to in our article. There is a similar but less specific condition in clause 11.3 (c) which applies if club revenues are less than required for ongoing viability.
DeleteThink you have calculated the net benefit for Australian society and shown it is less than 1. How the net societal loss is shared between Tasmania and the rest of Australia is not clear. As you point out "The question of how to finance a project producing net benefits is a separate issue." I believe it would be informative to do a BCA with financing to shed some light on the benefit/loss after finance. If the Federal Government donates $250m free of charge for the project they are bearing a significant share of the loss. I doubt this is sufficient to make the project attractive for Tasmania but would like to see the BCA.
ReplyDeletethey Feds are NOT donating $250m - they are advancing GST receipts which they will take back over the following years. So the ENTIRE cost will be borne by the Tasmanian taxpayer, and the losses over the next 20 years will be huge.
DeleteIt's about time to become carbon smart and climate aware.
ReplyDeleteThis whole debacle is a sideshow.
Our children's children and their friends will have other priorities to tackle.
AFL ,AFL , AFL = ...