Will there still be
a place in the world for Forestry Tasmania FT as a GBE after reality bites?
FT has struggled with cash flow and
profitability and now it’s selling some of its more commercial activities. All
the calls for FT to be restructured may be unnecessary. The in-house Voluntary
Liquidator Bob Gordon, like his counterpart at Gunns appears to be doing just
that, as assets are sold in an attempt to survive.
But is FT better prepared to face the future?
Given that we will become more dependent on plantations, has FT’s management
deftly and skilfully positioned FT to meet the challenges?
It is not the easiest task in the world to try
and isolate the contribution made to FT’s bottom line by its plantations versus
the contribution of the native forest segment. The Auditor General worked on
his report into FT’s performance for 3 years and wasn’t able to shed much light
on the issue. FT’s accounts do not provide a segment breakup to enable a reader
to better understand the financials.
Never have so many inquiries yielded so little
information. The only $ info on a segment basis is in the Sustainability Report
which lists the estimated Mill Door Landed Value for timber products from State
Forests. But these only give a rough clue as they don’t reconcile with FT’s
financials. The estimated mill door prices aren’t necessarily what FT received
and recorded in its financials.
The 2011 financials lists FT’s revenue from
forest sales at $135 million. But over half is reimbursement for the costs of
harvesting and transport to the mill door (or the wharf).The stumpage value of
sales was only about $55 million. And 80% of that is from native forests. The
reminder is from plantations. Less than half the plantation revenue, which in
this instance excludes the JV with GMO, is from hardwoods. Employee costs and
overheads eat up all of the $55 million, so there’s nothing there to fund any
capital outlays. FT’s woes have been so obvious for so long it’s a source of wonderment
that the Government has been so slack. And now there isn’t any money its
options are few so FT is selling assets to survive.
The size of the plantation estate managed by
FT and its Joint Venture partners has shown little change over the past few
financial years, at just over 50,000 hectares for both softwoods and hardwoods.
New plantings have declined in each of the
past 4 calendar years as shown below. The 2011 plantings only reflect a 6 month
period. Thus far only about 13,000 hectares pursuant to TCFA arrangements have
been planted over the last 5 years. The remaining 3,000 required hectares are
awaiting suitable land.
At 30th June 2011, FT owned/managed softwood
(Pinus radiata) plantations, of 52,670 hectares including the 46,000 hectares
Joint Venture with GMO which has just been sold to New Forests, leaving about
7,000 hectares, roughly a third of which is a JV arrangement with Norske Skog.
The current hardwood plantation estate
involving FT (i.e. excluding private forests on private land) of 55,960
hectares comprises approximately 85 per cent Eucalyptus nitens and 15 per cent
Eucalyptus globulus. With all those E.nitens it’s little wonder FT is such an
unrepentant supporter of the pulp mill. Only 30,000 hectares of hardwood
plantation trees are owned outright by FT, the rest is caught up in JV
arrangements, MISs via Tassie Tree Trusts and 14,830 hectares owned privately
but growing on Crown land. The latter probably includes trees owned by Gunns
and Gunns’ JV tree partners, which may change hands soon as Gunns follows the
same pattern as FT by selling assets in a desperate attempt to fend off the
bailiff while pretending to be preparing the ground for the pulp mill.
The breakup of FT’s plantation estate at 30th
June 2011 is outlined in the following table.
It’s a pretty sorry tale. The softwood estate
is all but gone. The hardwood estate will undoubtedly undergo ownership changes
in the near future. The 30,000 hectares of hardwood plantations owned outright
by FT is a possibility, even the underlying land as well.
It isn’t clear to the writer whether the State
will gain any return from its continued ownership of the 46,000 hectares of
pine plantation land. Under JV arrangements which take many forms, the
landowner doesn’t normally receive a rent payment but rather the crop proceeds
are split in such a way to reflect the different contributions of the JV
partners. But with the sale by the JV partners of their JV assets, the Crown is
simply a landlord. What will its rental stream be?
Of course if one were to accept the value of
land as determined by FT’s valuer, the plantation land has a zero value.
Perhaps rent is zero? That would make it a bargain purchase. Whose rent is it
anyway? FT’s? They don’t own the land. The Crown? They could do with a cash
boost.
If the pulp mill doesn’t proceed then it’s
back to the drawing board for the State’s hardwood plantation estate to try to
map out a Plan B. Or maybe the recent Strategic Review has laid out a path?
We’ll never know if they never release it. But given the current plantation
size, age and species, there won’t be enough cash to fund replanting. So what
will FT do?
If the pulp mill does proceed what happens to
FT’s hardwood plantations may well depend on what happens to Gunns’ plantation
land and trees? Will the latter become part of the pulp mill JV or will they be
owned by a third party? The 2011 financial accounts for Gunns included $654
million of Tasmanian land and plantations as assets for resale yet the
Chairman’s AGM address 3 months later referred to the company’s hardwood
plantation forest and processing assets with a carrying value of over $700
million as forming part of the equity base of the pulp mill project. So who
knows?
It still seems to be a buyer’s market for
large parcels of trees and plantation land as the prices are well below those
of a few years ago.
For instance when Gunns bought Auspine three
years ago, 45,000 hectares of land and pine plantations were booked at $435
million. Then Gunns offloaded 33,000 hectares of trees only for $173 million to
GMO clocking a much needed profit of $23 million. That’s just over $5,000 per
hectare for the trees.
Compare this to about $3,400 per hectare to be
paid by New Forests for the FT JV trees.
Gunns thought they had a buyer, rumoured to be
GMO, for the remaining Green Triangle trees plus all the 45,000 hectares of
land ex Auspine at $107 million. The deadline for completion of the sale kept
passing. The latest ASX announcement is that the deal has fallen over. The
Australian Financial Review (AFR) reported a new buyer was found to take not
only the remaining trees and land from Gunns for a reported $120 million, but
also the 33,000 hectares of trees from GMO. AFR suggested New Forests is the
buyer.
The figures seem to imply a price of about
$3,400 per hectare for the trees, similar to what it will pay FT, and about
$1,700 per hectare for the land, roughly the same price as New Forests paid as
part of the syndicate with Alberta Investment Management Corp which bought all
Great Southern’s land from the Liquidator McGrathNicol two years ago.
By way of a footnote the profit from the sale
of the first tranche of pine trees was an illusion as Gunns will end up blowing
about $140 million on Auspine land and trees over about a 3 year period, a 30%
loss of value.
Prices for hardwood plantations however will
be vastly different. Much less. The age profile of FT’s plantation is younger
and dominated by the selected strains of E. Nitens var firewoodii.
The proceeds of the sale of FT’s 50% share of
the softwood JV of $78 million will be used in the first instance to pay off
the $40 million owing to Tascorp because FT can no longer afford to pay the
interest on the loan. The remaining funds will be much needed to replenish the
TCFA cash tin as over $30 million is yet to be spent on the remaining 3,000
hectares of plantation establishment mentioned above plus all the pruning and
thinning as prescribed by the TCFA in order to achieve what one G L’Estrange
described as “the most expensive plantations in the world.”
The cash boost from the sale of the softwood
JV share will undoubtedly help FT pay the bills for the next couple of years.
But is it a sustainable set up? Hardly. FT still has a $120 million liability
in the form of an unfunded superannuation commitment, which it can’t service
from operations.
Prompting by Ruth Forrest’s Leg Co committee
investigation into FT’s performance finally persuaded FT that they needed to
fall into line with other State Government entities and start reporting some of
the costs of the unfunded superannuation as operating expenses. This has meant
that FT has had an operating loss for the last 5 years, when prior years’
financials are correctly restated. The Auditor General restated 4 years worth
of figures in his report to Parliament.
And if the Auditor General was more insistent
about including some of the costs of the trees that have been sold, as
operating rather than non-operating items, the situation would be far worse.
Had that been done FT would clearly be seen for what it is, a basket case
beyond salvation.
By incorrectly calculating operating profit
Messrs Gordon and Kloeden have been allowed to pretend FT was profitable, when
it clearly wasn’t. The entire FT Board with as impressive array of post
nominals as one is ever likely to see, failed to bring a switched on awareness
to the table. FT’s woes could have been addressed years ago with a more
accurate set of accounts. Alas, it’s now too late. The Australian Institute of
Company Directors to which FT Directors mostly belong should run a remedial
course on understanding published financial statements.
FT is still living in a world of complete
unreality if some of its publications are any guide. FT was particularly
selective as to what bits of the Auditor General’s Report into FT to include in
its 2011 Stewardship Report. One gets a different picture, for instance, if one
carefully reads what the normally mild mannered and reticent Auditor General
said in April 2009 but not reported till quite recently (and things have since
worsened):
“Profits have trended downwards since 1995,
mainly because of a substantial decline in softwood revenues. Other than
softwood, quantities sold had shown a small increase, prices had fallen and
costs had not changed substantially.
The return on assets has been consistently
poor. Analysis suggested Forestry’s assets were over-valued, but at recent
levels of profit, return on assets would only have been reasonable if no value
was assigned to the biological assets (trees) or land improvements (roads).
Without stronger financial performance,
investment in roads and plantations over the past 15 years will not yield
future benefits to Forestry and arguably should be expensed rather than
capitalised.
On that basis, it can be argued that
ordinary operations from 1994 to 2008 have yielded little profit. It also
follows that dividends paid had been entirely funded from abnormal receipts
such as Commonwealth compensation money.”
That’s it in a nutshell. Not much profit since
Methuselah was a boy, bludging off the Feds, the vehicle fleet pawned, the
softwood resource sold. Hang on to your seat Grandma, you could be next. The
plantation hardwood resource won’t be cash flow positive for a while, if ever,
and the native forests industry will be unable to sustain the current workforce
of 400+, the unfunded superannuation liabilities and the community service
obligations. FT is shedding its commercial operations and the State is going to
have to pick up the tab for the unfunded super and the CSOs, so do we really
need to interpose a GBE? It seems a ridiculously inappropriate structure.
Maybe the best course of action is to pack up
your empty lunch box, Bob, and go home. It’s almost knock off time.
And don’t bother coming back after Christmas.
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